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The Philippines have one of the longest lockdowns in the world in response to
COVID-19. This post reviews the past year, focusing on the main legal and political
issues as well as prospects in the country with the second highest total number of
COVID-19 cases in Southeast Asia.
Overview of Legal and Political Response and
Adaptation to COVID-19
The first imported case of COVID-19 was detected in the Philippines in late January
2020. Initially, the national administration downplayed the virus and claimed that the
country was on top of the situation. However, in early February, the administration
relented to pressure from some legislators and interest groups and imposed a
travel ban on flights from Wuhan, Macau, and Hong Kong. By February, voluntary
repatriation of Filipinos from Wuhan was initiated.
After the first cases of local transmission, President Rodrigo Duterte declared a
state of public health emergency in the country on 8 March (Proclamation No.
922) and suspendedschool classes in Metro Manila. This declaration adheres to
the 1987 Constitution, particularly the State’s policy to protect and promote the
right to health of the people (Article II, Section 15), and the Law on Reporting of
Communicable Diseases (Republic Act [RA] No. 11332), which provides that the
Philippine President shall declare the state of public health emergency in case
there is an epidemic of national and/or international concern that threatens national
security and enables the President to mobilize agencies and resources to address
the threat.
A partial lockdown of Metro Manila from 15 March to 14 April was announced,
together with suspension of travel to and from Manila. On 16 March, the entire
Luzon group of islands was placed under enhanced community quarantine (ECQ),
effectively a total lockdown and the strictest category of lockdown imposed in the
country. In the next few months, the government would impose various types of
quarantine and the list of allowed and disallowed activities outside homes evolved
based on the changing evaluations of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Emerging
Infectious Diseases (IATF).
On 16 March, the President signed Proclamation No. 929 placing the country
under a state of calamity due to COVID-19 for six months, again adhering to the
Constitution’s Article II, Section 15 and the Philippines Disaster Risk Reduction
and Management Act (RA No. 10121). The proclamation allows the national and
local governments ample leeway to utilize appropriate funds in their disaster
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preparedness and response efforts to contain the spread of COVID-19 and continue
provision of basic services to their respective populations. 
After 15 May, there was a gradual easing of lockdown in certain areas depending on
the number of COVID-19 cases, with the main aim of enabling economic recovery.
Metro Manila’s ECQ was lifted on 1 June, replaced by general community quarantine
(GCQ), which allowed some economic activities to resume and limited public
transportation to operate. However, for certain periods in the year in the country,
some areas were put under modified ECQ (MECQ) which further limited economic
activities due to a spike of cases and the demand of health workers’ associations
to allow the health and hospital system to “breathe” and improve as hospitalshad
already exceeded the capacity to handle COVID-19 patients. Later in the year,
most of the rest of the country was under modified general community quarantine
(MGCQ), the loosest quarantine phase that permits many businesses and other
activities to open with some limitations.
The initial period of the country’s state of calamity was further extended by
Proclamation No. 1021 (dated September 2020) until 12 September 2021. Due
to a spike of cases again since January 2021, continued limitations in contract
tracing, testing and resources of healh facilities, as well as a delay in the purchase
of vaccines, restrictions began to increase again. Metro Manila and neighboring
provinces were once again under ECQ from 29 March to 11 April and under ECQ
until 30 April.    
In legislation, in March 2020, Congress upon request of the President approved
the Bayanihan to Heal as One (RA No. 11469) (“Bayanihan Act”). The law gave
the President some emergency powers for three months to optimize efforts in the
pandemic response as support to the first two presidential proclamations on national
health emergency and national calamity. (Bayanihan is a Filipino cultural value
used to refer to a spirit of communal unity and cooperation.) The law expired on 25
June 2020 and the Office of the President requested Congress to pass a second
Bayanihan law focused on recovery. By September 2020, Bayanihan to Recover
as One (RA No. 11494 or Bayanihan 2), which lays out the country’s COVID-19
response and allocates funds to help struggling sectors cope with the pandemic’s
impacts, has been approved by Congress and signed by the President. Bayanihan2
expired in December 2020 but appropriations made under the law are extended up
to June 2021.
The Executive and Use of Powers in Response to
Emergency
Temporary emergency powers of the President are constitutional when obtained
through legislative enactment specifically to allow the executive branch to better
address a particular threat facing the Philippines and its people by means of a
declaration. During war or other national emergencies, the two Houses of Congress
may, by law, “authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
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restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy.” (Article VI, Section 23)
Emergency powers are granted to the President by Bayanihan 1 and 2 Acts.
Other declarations regarding the health emergency and the state of calamity
mentioned earlier are based on earlier legislations. These are the first national health
emergency powers legislated by Congress for the President to exercise since the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, although this is not the first time that Congress
granted special temporary emergency powers to the President and to the executive
branch of government under the Constitution to address a crisis.
The declaration of the national health emergency in the laws did not invalidate the
Constitution or any of its provisions, particularly the Bill of Rights. However, as we
will see in other sections of this post and based on an constitutional performance
assessment in the period of a pandemic, despite the constitutional and other legal
safeguards in the exercise of emergency powers, there was greater consolidation of
powers in the executive branch and a further weakening of the separation of powers.
Executive dominance has already been noted in a pre-pandemic performance
assessment of the Constitution; the trend has been exacerbated with COVID-19.
The executive branch has dominated the pandemic response, for better or for worse,
and its implementation has resulted not only in a poorly planned and coordinated
response to the pandemic but also in the further weakening of other institutions and
democratic institutions, processes, and principles.
The current Cabinet has been disproportionately led by former or retired military
and police generals and they largely dictate national responses to the pandemic.
Thus, citizens are mostly instructed to “obey” the rules even if some of them are
lacking clear guidelines, instead of harnessing cooperation, civil duty, and true
bayanihan spirit of cooperating and helping fellow citizens. Civilian health and other
experts have difficulties getting their analyses and suggestions to the executive
branch. Instead of providing concrete plans and comprehensive reports related to
the pandemic response, the President’s weekly public briefings and the daily press
briefings of Cabinet members and Department representatives have been used to
attack and discredit critics, the opposition, activists, and some media groups and
businesses accused of being enemies of the government. 
The Effectiveness of Judicial and Legislative
Scrutiny and Oversight
While Congress has passed the two Bayanihan Acts swiftly since the President
certified them as urgent, the Constitution and the laws oblige the President’s office
to make an accounting to Congress of all actions taken throughout the period of
national emergency and to submit regular reports to Congress of all acts performed,
including the amount and utilization of funds pursuant to addressing the pandemic.
Congress, after all, exercises oversight functions over the other branches of
government.
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Yet, even before the pandemic, both Houses have been dominated by blocs allied
with the President. In a country with weak political parties and personality-oriented
politics, most traditional legislators/politicians ally themselves with a popular Chief
Executive, who appears to enjoy high trust ratings even in surveys conducted during
the pandemic. Even during COVID-19, Congress in July 2020 passed the Anti-
Terrorism Act which has questionable provisions that limit the role of the Judiciary
and the Commission on Human Rights and threaten the rights of people “suspected”
of committing “terrorist” acts. Congress has also denied a new franchise to ABS-
CBN, the largest broadcast network with the widest reach nation-wide and accused it
of having displeased the President, on the basis of certain questionable technicalities
in June 2020.   
Thus, in this pandemic, there is little information as to the extent Congress has
scrutinized the weekly reports submitted by the Office of the President to Congress
or how much deliberation has surrounded their submission. Both Houses’ leadership
and the Congressional Oversight Committee declared satisfaction with the executive
branch’s performance as regards Bayanihan 1, despite opposition legislators’
insistence for more scrutiny, especially regarding how the substantive amount of
money involved in the pandemic response was spent.
What has been more obvious since 2020 has been the targeting of investigations
into specific Departments. For instance, the two Houses have been conducting
continuing hearings related to the Department of Health’s (DOH) readiness and
continuing responses to the pandemic, and corruption allegations in the Philippine
health insurance system. However, save for a few resignations of some officials in
the insurance system, there has not been much impact on the direction of the DOH’s
pandemic response.      
Lower courts have ruled on issues of alleged violations committed by executive
agencies in the enforcement of the national health emergency. Courts, despite their
operations being affected by the pandemic, have in several instances pointed out
that law enforcers, i.e. the police and local enforcers, have committed errors in their
application of policies related not only to the Bayanihan Acts but also to quarantine
laws and to related local ordinances, particularly in arresting supposed violators, who
are mostly community organizers and poor people trying to continue making a living
despite the pandemic.
Since 2016, the Supreme Court and the Judiciary have weakened in terms of
independence vis-à-vis the executive and legislative branches, highlighted by the
Court’s removal of the Chief Justice appointed by the previous President through an
unprecedented quo warranto petition filed by the Solicitor General in 2018. There
have also been 61 lawyers, judges, and prosecutors killed in the five years of the
Duterte Administration, more than the combined number of those killed from the
administrations of Ferdinand Marcos to Benigno Aquino III.
In 2020, the Supreme Court now dominated by Duterte appointees denied a petition
seeking to declare the Bayanihan 1 Act unconstitutional on the grounds that it failed
to show grave abuse of discretion. However, proof that various groups still see the
Supreme Court as the last bastion of democracy and human rights is the number of
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petitions (37) filed by various groups against the controversial Anti-Terror Law. Oral
arguments have begun, amidst observation of strict safety measures and delayed
by various forms of lockdown, since February 2021. In an unprecedented move, and
giving in to demands for decisive action from lawyers, the Supreme Court en banc
has issued a statement in March 2021 condemning the killings of lawyers, judges,
and prosecutors, and vowed to look into institutional changes to better protect them. 
         
Regional and Local Governments’ Responses
Since the beginning of COVID-19, there have been a number of local government
units (LGUs) led by fast-thinking and innovative mayors, which have been proactive
not only in trying to mitigate the spread of the virus in their localities, but in dealing
with the dislocation of constituents and other effects of the lockdown. Some of these
LGUs had good coordination with national agencies, but some had to work with the
private sector and other civil society groups in the absence of clear instructions from
the national government, particularly in the beginning of the pandemic. These LGUs
and mayors had at their disposal relatively large incomes and resources compared
to others, skilled local bureaucracy, good data management and evidence-based
decision-making, good partnerships with the private sector and civil society groups,
and participatory mechanisms. However, some LGUs failed to meet the challenges
of COVID-19 and the responsibilities during the crisis because of limited resources,
lack of good management skills, the dominance of patronage politics, corruption, and
other problems.
The inequity in capacity and access to resources among LGUs, and how it impacts
consistency in effective service delivery, despite significant powers devolved to
LGUs since the 1991 Local Government, is further highlighted by the pandemic.
Perhaps one potential development of the pandemic is that there might be more
roles for regional bodies or groupings of LGUs, beyond development planning but
in localizing many plans and developing appropriate services for their constituents,
in the future. Regional Inter-Agency Task Forces were also eventually created to
be the IATF’s local counterparts, though they are supervised by a Cabinet member
assigned to the region by the President. The newly reconstituted autonomous
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, the only autonomous region
with a regional government created as a result of a peace agreement between
the Philippine government and Muslim rebels in the pursuit of lasting peace and
development in the region, has also been working on the additional challenges
posed by COVID-19 in trying to combat the spread of the virus in a poor area where
peace is fragile.
Human Rights and Civil Liberties Considerations
The pandemic response of the national government has definitely curtailed a number
of civil, political, social and economic rights. Generally, most people obey the
lockdown rules for fear of getting COVID-19. However, many of them, particularly
poor people and those who do not have secure employment would have wanted
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better support for the loss of livelihood as well as equal access to health and other
services. But the poorly planned and uncoordinated response of the government has
left a large number of people uninformed, stranded, jobless, and without access to
proper health services and social welfare. Some of them have to beg on the streets
and try to earn income despite the lockdown. Even returning overseas Filipino
workers, who contribute to the economy from their remittances, who lost their jobs
abroad face plenty of challenges. In the middle of 2020, the country experienced it
first recession in 29 years, with unemployment rate in January 2021 at 8.7%.    
What is worrying is the very strong, punitive but unequal response to citizens
accused of violating curfew and lockdown policies by implementers (mostly police
and local enforcers). Illegal arrests and detention are cases in point. There are
reports of curfew violators placed in dog cages, and some even being killed. Even
students and volunteers providing feeding programs and Labor Day protestors
were subjected to so-called “red-tagging” and arrested even if most protests by
civil society follow physical distancing protocols. However, inequality in treatment is
clearly shown as most of those arrested or punished for violations are poor people
while influencers, government officials, and rich people who are also violators are
treated humanely and accorded with courtesies by implementors.
Together with these violations of people’s rights during the pandemic, extrajudicial
killing of suspected drug users and pushers and “red”-tagging of critics and
those labelled as opposition, even if they are university students and professors,
entertainers, legitimate civil society groups, farmers, indigenous peoples, and
professionals continues.       
The above observations are complemented by global indices. The V-Dem Pandemic
Democratic Violations Index mentioned the Philippines as one of seven countries
with a high risk of pandemic backsliding. The International IDEA’s COVID-19
Monitor, meanwhile, pointed out three worrying areas of freedom of expression,
media integrity, and predictable enforcement.    
2021 Outlook: Recommendations for Governance,
Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law
Urgent issues that need to be addressed include the need to add more active
pressure on the executive branch to be accountable for its actions as regards the
pandemic and other issues, more legislators that will use and strengthen Congress’
exercise of its legislative and oversight functions, a more independent Judiciary
that would fairly scrutinize all issues brought to it, more civilian oversight over
the military and the police, stronger political parties and reforms in the electoral
system to increase representation, protecting independent accountability institutions,
upholding the rights of citizens and groups, promoting accurate public information
and education, and strengthening the spirit of community and active citizenship that
has been on display more prominently since the pandemic.    
Finally, the pandemic is a game changer in the immediate future of the Philippines.
Responses to it will be a major issue to check on the administration’s accountability.
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The 2022 national and local elections, which are already in the minds of both
voters and politicians, will add to the complexities of decision-making and actions
of many actors, including the responses to the pandemic this year. COVID-19
will be an election issue, whether candidates and parties like it or not. There are
already indications that some citizens and groups are mobilizing to push for more
appropriate responses to the pandemic as well as more progressive multisectoral
groupings in preparation for the elections next year. We will see how these will be
successful given the threats to democracy and the rule of law that have been present
even before but have intensified during the pandemic.
*Note: Some sections are updated sections from  the author’s paper for the
Melbourne Forum 2020’s Webinar 1: Emergency Powers and COVID-19, held
last September 2020 and from the report she co-authored entitled Constitutional
Performance Assessment in the time  of a Pandemic: The 1987 Constitution and the
Philippines’ COVID-19 Response  (2020).
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